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Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory 
Environment: 
 
Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and 
Audit Engagement Partners 
 
ABSTRACT 
In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate 
governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role 
for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms.  UK listed company 
chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners 
(APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and 
regulatory factors on audit quality.  498 usable responses were received, representing 
a response rate of 36%.  All groups rated various audit committee interactions with 
auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality.  Exploratory factor analysis 
reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions.  In order of extraction, these 
are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm 
ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit 
firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection.  
In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both 
economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality.  
However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance-
compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective.  Respondents commented 
that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with 
high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that 
claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.   
 
Keywords: audit quality, regulation, audit committees; audit inspection; ISAs. 
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Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory 
Environment:Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs 
and Audit Engagement Partners 
 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
The economic crisis is the latest event to raise interest globally in audit quality, the 
integrity of financial reporting and corporate governance. The scale of the problem 
has also raised expectations of further regulation in the banking sector which may 
well impact on reporting, auditing and governance outside this sector.  National 
regulatory systems are increasingly interconnected with supranational private sector 
standard setting bodies, such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and governmental bodies 
such as the European Union (EU) (e.g., Cooper and Robson, 2006: 430).   
 
However, interest in audit quality and in related changes in regulation and practice 
have been ongoing for many years.  Reviewing trends in US audit regulation, Kinney 
(2005) observes that the 1980s heralded in a period of de-regulation (consistent with 
policy shifts to allow competition and market forces greater influence).  Some writers 
argue that this period of regulatory capitalism was instrumental in the emergence of 
conceptions of the audit as a commodity driven by economic considerations of the 
auditee management and the need to deliver added value to the client company 
(Jeppesen, 1998; Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). In the practice field, 
business risk auditing approaches emerged in the 1990s (Power, 2007).   
 
The Enron scandal in 2002, however, prompted a global shift to re-regulation 
(Kinney, 2005).  In the US, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) introduced major 
changes to the US audit, financial reporting and corporate governance regimes. 
Similar regulatory changes subsequently occurred in the UK and many other countries 
(Lennox, 2009).  Scandal and regulatory change has brought attendant changes in the 
conceptualisation of practice.  For example, Khalifa, Sharma, Humphrey and Robson 
(2007) present evidence that the dominant audit discourse shifted from one of 
‘business value’ to one of ‘audit quality’.  
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The loss of Enron’s audit firm, Andersens, left only four major firms dominating the 
global audit market and led to an overall loss of confidence in audit quality which 
affected the remaining firms and created concerns about competition and choice for 
major companies using audit services in this market (e.g. General Accounting Office 
(GAO), 2003; US Treasury, 2007; FRC, 2007; EC, 2008).  Generally, however, it was 
concluded that market-led solutions were to be encouraged in the first instance (GAO, 
2008; FRC, 2008).  SOX made significant changes to the US listed company auditing 
and governance regimes including: inspection of listed company audits by a new 
independent agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB); 
independent setting of auditing standards; restriction of non-audit services; and a 
requirement for greater engagement with the auditors by the company audit 
committee.  
 
Confidence in audit quality was not just a problem in the US.  As Andersen was a 
global firm, audit clients and regulators in many other countries were affected.  
Ensuring that the remaining firms carried out high quality audits in the future was 
seen as paramount to making sure that no other firms failed.  Thus many changes to 
the regulatory regime for auditors were also made in other jurisdictions including the 
UK and the EU.  Following a government review (CGAA, 2003), major changes in 
the UK included the restructuring of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which 
took responsibility for setting auditing standards, setting ethical standards for auditors 
and conducting independent inspections of public interest audits.  The review also 
included changes to the UK Combined Code for Corporate Governance requiring 
much closer engagement between the audit committee of a company and its auditors, 
thus creating a much more significant role for the audit committee chair (ACC) in the 
audit process (FRC, 2003).  A further major change in the EU was the move to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 for the group accounts of 
all companies listed on EU markets.  This change required the input of significant 
resources for all companies (Dunne, Fifield, Finningham, Fox, Hannah, Helliar, 
Power and Veneziani, 2008).  
 
Given the enhanced role of the audit committee in the relationship between a 
company and its auditors, the audit committee chair (ACC) is now a key party in the 
audit process.  There have been no studies in the UK or other jurisdictions which have 
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simultaneously sought the views of the three key preparer groups (i.e. chief financial 
officers (CFOs), ACCs and audit engagement partners (APs) on the impact of the post 
Enron regime on audit quality.  The most recent UK study was carried out before the 
post-Enron changes were introduced (Duff, 2004).  
 
Sadly, this avalanche of regulation has not prevented the meltdown in the banking 
sector that western economies have recently experienced.  Some observers have 
questioned whether audit quality failures contributed to the crisis (e.g., Holmes and 
Sukhraj, 2008; Sikka, 2009).  However, the UK Parliament Treasury Committee, as 
part of its Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, investigated the role of auditors (Treasury 
Committee, 2009) and concluded that they  
‘had received very little evidence that auditors failed to fulfil their duties as 
currently stipulated.  The fact that some banks failed soon after receiving 
unqualified audits does not necessarily mean that these audits were deficient.  
But the fact that the audit process failed to highlight developing problems in 
the banking sector does cause us to question exactly how useful audit 
currently is. We are perturbed that the process results in “tunnel vision”, 
where the big picture that shareholders want to see is lost in a sea of detail 
and regulatory disclosures’ (Paragraph 221).  
 
The aim of the present study is to evaluate, from the preparer and auditor 
perspectives, the effectiveness of recent changes to the audit regulatory landscape.  
Specifically, the study: (a) identifies the extent to which CFOs, ACCs and APs of UK 
listed companies believe that key features of the 2007 regulatory environment (which 
has since changed little) enhance or undermine audit quality; (b) establishes whether 
the responses differ significantly depending on respondents beliefs regarding the 
value of audit to the company or client; and (c) identifies the changes to either the 
regulatory framework or the behaviour of auditors which the respondents believe 
would most improve audit quality.  The research is carried out by means of a 
contemporaneous survey of all three groups.  New regulatory factors are considered 
alongside pre-existing regulatory and economic factors in order that the relative 
effectiveness of new regulation can be assessed in context.  
 
Given that this study was carried out in 2007 and concerns about the role of audit 
were expressed by the Treasury Committee based on the bank audits with 2007 year 
ends, the research findings are also considered in the context of the conclusions drawn 
by the Treasury Committee (2009) in relation to the regulatory framework.  
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The findings of this research should provide policy makers with valuable evidence to 
inform future policy in relation to the desirability of and attitudes to further changes to 
the UK and other regimes that may be considered in response to the economic crisis.  
In recent years, there has been a growing call for evidence-based policy making that 
assesses the effects of financial regulation, including the costs, benefits and 
particularly the unintended consequences (Buijink, 2006; Pawson, 2006; Mulherin, 
2007; Schipper, 2009). 
 
The paper is constructed as follows: Section two provides more detail about the 2007 
UK regulatory framework and also includes an overview of the literature on 
regulation and audit quality.  Section three describes the research methodology and 
research questions.  Section four provides the results and section five summarises and 
concludes. 
 
REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE UK AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Changes to the UK regulatory regime  
UK-specific changes include the UK’s own response to the Enron crisis (CGAA, 
2003) and the 2006 Companies Act.  The CGAA review resulted in the Accountancy 
Foundation (the oversight body established by the accountancy professional bodies in 
2002) being replaced by a restructured FRC, with several new operating bodies.  
Originally set up in 1992, the FRC’s remit was to set and enforce accounting 
standards (via the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP)) and to maintain the Combined Code for Corporate 
Governance.  Its responsibilities were extended to include control of the Auditing 
Practices Board (APB), the Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB) and 
general oversight via the Professional Oversight Board (POB)).1  The effect of this 
was to remove completely any responsibility for audit standard setting and oversight 
of the profession from the accountancy professional bodies.  
 
The Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP), which is responsible for ensuring 
compliance with accounting requirements, added risk based pro-active monitoring of 
the financial statements of public interest entities to its existing model of reacting to 
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complaints and publicly available information.  The FRRP now selects industry 
sectors and specific areas of financial information, combined with an assessment of 
company specific risk factors.  Its remit was also extended to monitoring the 
requirements of the UK listing rules (FRC, 2005: 7). 
 
In addition to its existing duties of setting auditing standards, the APB took 
responsibility for setting ethical standards for auditors.  Two key provisions of the 
ethical standards, which reflect the European Commission’s (EC) fundamental 
principles for auditor independence (European Commission, 2002), are: mandatory 
rotation of all partners on each listed company audit, with the audit engagement 
partner in the UK rotating every five years; and greater restrictions on the provision of 
non-audit services (APB, 2004a).  The POB became responsible for the inspection of 
public interest audits and the publication of the results of the inspections.  This work 
is carried out by the POB’s Audit Inspection Unit (AIU, 2008).  
 
Further regulatory developments have occurred that affect the auditing environment 
since these regulatory structures were put in place.  International Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs) were adopted by the APB (adapted for the UK environment) (APB, 
2004b) and became mandatory for all UK audits from December 2005 year ends 
onwards.  In early 2009, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) completed its 5 year long project to ‘clarify’ ISAs.2  The EU issued the 
revised 8th Statutory Audit Directive and ethical standards for auditors were amended 
to ensure that they would be consistent with changes in the law which were to arise 
from the implementation of this Directive in 2008 (APB, 2007).   
 
In the area of accounting regulation, EU legislation mandated the use of IFRS by UK 
listed companies in their consolidated financial statements for December 2005 year 
ends, replacing UK GAAP (EU, 2002).  This caused significant changes in accounting 
and hence auditing practice.  In particular, IFRS do not clearly state the ‘substance 
over form’ principle of FRS 5 Reporting the Substance of Transactions (ASB, 1994).  
Decisions to extend the use of IFRS to other company accounts, was left to member 




The third audit-related regulatory sphere to experience significant change was 
corporate governance.  A formal framework emerged from the UK financial scandals 
of the early 1990s in the form of the Cadbury Report (1992) which subsequently 
became the Combined Code (and is soon to become the UK Corporate Governance 
Code).  The UK market regulator, the Financial Services Authority, requires listed 
companies to provide a ‘comply or explain’ statement in their annual report which 
sets out how the Combined Code has been applied by the company (FRC, 2006a).3  
Code provision C3.1 states that ‘The board should establish an audit committee of at 
least three or in the case of smaller companies two, members, who shall all be 
independent non-executive directors.  The board should satisfy itself that at least one 
member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience.’  The 
responsibilities of the audit committee include monitoring ‘the integrity of the 
financial statements of the company…reviewing significant financial reporting 
judgments contained in them’ (provision C3.2).  The auditor’s responsibilities in 
relation to communication with those charged with governance are contained in ISA 
(UK and Ireland) 260 (APB, 2004c).  Timely communication with the relevant parties 
in the company is required about audit matters.  
 
To summarise, UK re-regulation in the audit arena post-Enron has been significant.  
There are now more regulatory bodies (e.g. the FRC’s AIU) and these bodies they 
have a more intrusive mandate (e.g. FRRP now takes a proactive rather than a reactive 
approach) (Kershaw, 2006: 389). 
 
Regulation theory 
The literature on regulation adopts different theoretical perspectives, with the 
principal espoused approach drawing on the economics discipline (regulatory 
economics and public policy economics).  Evidence of market failure, often combined 
with regulatory impact analysis, is used to justify the need for regulation on social 
welfare grounds.  Regulatory impact analysis, however, does not necessarily identify 
the unintended consequences (often undesirable) of regulatory intervention.  
 
If the case for market intervention is made, the general form of regulation must be 
decided. The main alternative regulatory forms (self-regulation versus government 
regulation) represent the classic trade-off between independence and expertise4.  The 
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regulatory economics literature argues that the potential efficiency gains from self-
regulation are attributable to the producers’ superior knowledge of the issues, their 
greater ability to adapt to changing institutional conditions and the lower transaction 
costs of the regulatory process.  To be set against this is the risk of self-interested 
participation in the process (Grajzl and Murrell, 2007).  In the government model, 
however, regulatory capture is also a danger (Dal Bo, 2006). Beyond the general form 
of regulation, specific choices must be made in relation to, for example, self-reporting 
versus traditional direct monitoring of violations and inspection regimes. However, 
despite the risk of capture, the aftermath of the Enron collapse and loss of confidence 
in the accountancy profession led to a further move away from professional self 
regulation to regulation by a government agency, the FRC.  
 
In the financial arena, regulation encompasses the regulation of both rules (standards 
and guidelines) and the groups subject to the rules (e.g. share dealers, accountants and 
auditors).  Hirschleifer (2008), a behavioural financial economist, proposes a 
psychological, rather than an economic, theory of financial regulation.  He argues that 
‘certain beliefs about regulation are especially good at exploiting psychological biases 
to attract attention and support.  This irrationality, especially of the proponents of 
regulation, pervades the political discourse of regulation and strengthens the case for 
laissez-faire.  Several underlying social and psychological processes in financial 
regulation are identified.  Salience and vividness effects (i.e. events that draw 
attention), the violation of fairness and reciprocity norms, scapegoating, the 
availability heuristic amplified by media attention are all illustrated by the Enron 
scandal and the subsequent enactment of SOX.  There also exists inherent 
overconfidence that a useful regulatory solution exists.  Hirschleifer recommends that 
regulatory inertia should be built into the system to counteract the detrimental effect 
of these biases at the societal level. 
 
Accounting and auditing regulation involves, prima facie, the professional 
accountancy associations, standard-setting bodies and regulatory agencies.  
Additionally, however, the professional firms (especially the global Big Four) are an 
increasingly important ‘node in the network of institutions through which regulatory 
and professional processes operate’ (e.g., Cooper and Robson, 2006, p.417). Adopting 
a political science perspective, Cooper and Robson (2006) argue that regulation has 
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been used to restore trust, a view which resonates with Hischleifer’s (2008) scapegoat 
bias.  Humphrey, Loft and Woods (2009) explore the impact of the financial crisis on 
the international financial architecture of the last decade, which can be characterised 
as a ‘standards-surveillance-compliance’ system based on transparency (Wade, 2007).  
They conclude that, in the wake of the crisis, this system is being strengthened, rather 
than changed.  This system of financial regulation, which emphasises calculable 
standards and outcomes, arguably mirrors the rise of new managerialism in the fields 
of education and the public sector.  
 
Research into audit quality 
Audit quality can be conceptualised as ‘a theoretical continuum ranging from very 
low to very high’ (Francis, 2004: 346.).  DeAngelo’s (1981: 186) seminal economic 
analysis defines audit quality as the ‘market-assessed joint probability that a given 
auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system and (b) report 
the breach’.  Subsequently, however, researchers have recognised that these two 
characteristics of competence and independence do not represent the whole spectrum 
of audit quality attributes, with the effectiveness of the regulatory framework, service 
quality and responsiveness also being important aspects (e.g. Warming-Rasmussen 
and Jensen, 1998; Duff, 2004).  
 
Recently, the FRC (2006b) considered how to identify the drivers of audit quality and 
promote audit quality.  Having identified the lack of a clear agreed definition of audit 
quality, the FRC cites a key definition provided by the AIU (FRC, 2006b: 19): 
‘Undertaking a quality audit involves obtaining sufficient and appropriate 
audit evidence to support the conclusions on which the audit report is based 
and making objective and appropriate audit judgments. A quality audit [also] 
involves appropriate and complete reporting by the auditors which enables the 
Audit Committee and the Board properly to discharge their responsibilities.’   
 
The FRC subsequently issued its Audit Quality Framework (FRC, 2008) which 
identified five drivers of audit quality: the culture within an audit firm; the skills and 
personal qualities of audit partners and staff; the effectiveness of the audit process; the 
reliability and usefulness of audit reporting; and factors outside the control of auditors 
affecting audit quality.  
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As the audit process is unobservable, the appearance as well as the fact of the 
behaviour of auditors is essential to public confidence in the value of audit.  
DeAngelo (1981) refers to this as the ‘market-assessed’ probability of breach 
detection and reporting.  Quantitative archival empirical research into audit quality 
has used various observable outcomes to proxy for audit quality, such as: audit 
opinions; auditor selection and change decisions; financial statement outcomes; and 
analysts’ forecasts.  Reviewing 25 years of empirical audit quality research, Francis 
(2004) concludes that the most significant development in audit quality research is 
grounded in the assumption that differences in audit quality exist and can be inferred 
by comparing different groups of auditors.  The main basis of differentiation is 
between large and small auditors (typically the Big Four versus the non-Big Four).  It 
is argued that large audit firms are less dependent on any single client and also that 
they have incentives to protect their brand name.  Research has shown that there is 
demand for quality-differentiated audits and that the top tier audit firms are higher 
quality (have lower thresholds for issuing modified audit reports and more effectively 
curtail aggressive earnings management).   
 
Other archival approaches to researching audit quality have examined, inter alia: audit 
firm and audit partner rotation; the impact of corporate governance characteristics; and 
the impact of audit firm review and inspection.  Each of these is briefly considered. 
 
Long audit firm tenure is believed by some to lead to overly ‘cosy’ relationships between 
the auditor and the client company management and a loss of independence.  Mandatory 
audit firm rotation has been called for called for to remedy this situation.  Others argue 
that auditors’ independence incentives are sufficient and that the inevitable learning 
curve of incoming auditors could lead to lower quality audits in the early years.  A less 
radical intervention is to require audit partner rotation.  A five year rotation period was 
introduced in many jurisdictions post-Enron (e.g. SEC, 2003).  The evidence is mixed -  
studies set in Australia have shown that audit quality improves upon audit partner 
rotation (e.g. Fargher, Lee and Mande, 2008), whereas recent German evidence shows 
no association between mandatory audit engagement partner rotation and audit quality, 
but does find that audit quality declines upon the rotation of the audit review partner 
(Watrin, Lindscheid and Pott, 2009).  In the UK, the APB recently proposed that the 
rotation period specified in the Ethical Standards for Auditors be increased from five to 
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seven years (APB, 2009a), although the arguments for both periods were described as 
‘finely balanced’.  The revised ethical standard allows this extended period for the audit 
engagement partner of listed companies only if the audit committee determine that it is 
necessary to safeguard audit quality, with disclosure to the shareholders (APB, 2009b, 
§16-17). The period for engagement quality control reviewers and key partners is seven 
years (§19).  
 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) analyse a US dataset of audit committee and other corporate 
governance characteristics in relation to earnings misstatements.  They find that the 
independence of the audit committees did not influence the frequency of restatements, 
although the presence of an independent director with financial expertise did reduce the 
frequency of restatements.  
In many countries, systems of audit firm review and inspection have changed 
significantly in recent years.  From 1988 until 2002, audit firms operating in the US with 
SEC clients were subject to mandatory peer review every three years, with the results of 
this review being publicly disclosed.5 Hilary and Lennox (2005) find that audit firms 
gained clients following receipt of a clean opinion and lost clients following receipt of an 
adverse opinion, suggesting that the process credibly signaled audit quality, a conclusion 
confirmed by Casterella, Jensen and Knechel (2009).  Following SOX, this model was 
replaced by independent inspections carried out by the PCAOB.  Lennox and Pittman 
(2010) find that audit firms’ market shares are not sensitive to these reports.  They 
conclude that this may be because the inspectors are not seen to possess adequate 
technical knowledge and/or because the PCAOB reports are less informative that the 
peer review reports (as they do not disclose quality control problems).  DeFond (2010) 
points out that this conclusion must be tempered by consideration of several related 
issues: (i) a lack of information value does not necessarily mean that the inspections are 
ineffective; (ii) the new regime may be effective in providing ex ante incentives for audit 
quality to improve, by applying stricter standards and/or imposing more severe penalties; 
(iii) the quality of financial reporting may have improved post SOX.  By contrast, in the 
Dutch setting, Van de Poel, Opijnen, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2009) conclude that 
independent inspections are effective in detecting audit quality. 
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The advantage of these indirect, archival approaches is that real-world data are used; 
however, the causal connection between the variables of interest is not always clear-cut.  
Research designs that employ direct methods, rather than indirect methods, include 
experimental and survey studies.  In an experiment using Danish auditors, Windsor and 
Warming-Rasmussen (2009) find that the majority of auditors were not consistently 
independent in the context of client economic factors (client financial condition, size 
of fees and whether audit is tendered), indicating that IFAC’s code of ethics appeal to 
‘independence of mind’ is not effective. 
 
There have been relatively few surveys of attitudes and beliefs regarding audit quality 
and what the key dimensions are.  An advantage of this research approach is that the 
relative importance of a range of factors can be assessed.  Carcello, Hermanson and 
McGrath (1992) survey preparers, auditors and users in the US and find that important 
factors are: knowledge of the client; industry expertise; responsiveness; and compliance 
with auditing standards.  Post-SOX, 82% of 253 US audit committee members surveyed 
believe that audit quality has improved (Center for Audit Quality, 2008).  The reasons 
for improvement were identified as being: increased audit committee oversight; 
requirements regarding internal controls; better communication with audit committees; 
CEO/CFO sign-off on financial statements; increased emphasis on quality of auditors; 
more rigorous audits; and audit committee oversight of auditors.  Interview evidence 
from US company directors indicates that new regulation on the management-external 
auditor-audit committee relationship has improved audit quality, although there are 
suggestions that this benefit has involved costly compliance (Cohen, Hayes, 
Krishnamoorthy, Monroe and Wright, 2009).  In Australia, interviews with key 
stakeholders reveal that the introduction of legally enforceable Australian Auditing 
Standards has not increased perceived audit quality (Hecimovic, Martinov-Bennie and 
Roebuck, 2009). 
 
In the UK, Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (1998, 1999) find that the factors that audit 
partners, finance directors and financial journalists most believed to enhance auditor 
independence in the pre Enron environment were: existence of an audit committee; risk 
of referral to the FRRP ; and risk to the audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor Status.  
Duff (2004) distinguishes between technical quality and service quality in a survey 
carried out in 2001-2 before the post Enron changes were implemented.  It is found that 
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technical quality is characterised by status, independence and knowledge, while service 
quality is characterised by responsiveness, non-audit services and understanding of the 
client.  In a UK investor survey about independence threats, Dart (2009) finds 
economic dependence in general and non-audit service provision in particular to be 
the most serious threats.  The post Enron changes in the UK have significantly limited 
the opportunities for non-audit services provision, although economic dependence is 
still considered to be a threat.  
 
To date, however, there have been no studies undertaken in the changed UK 
environment which have sought the views on audit quality of CFOs, audit partners, and, 
importantly, audit committee chairs.  The present study seeks to fill this lacuna. 
 
 




Many regulatory changes impacting on the audit process have been implemented in 
the past few years.  The focus of this study is to elicit the views of three key participant 
groups in the audit / financial reporting process, CFOs, ACCs and APs, on the features 
of the economic and regulatory environment which influenced audit quality in 2007, just 
before the current financial crisis emerged.  We are particularly interested in the 
perceived effectiveness of the new (post-SOX) regulatory factors compared to pre-
existing regulatory factors and continuing economic factors such as economic 
dependence.  Our first detailed research question, which serves to contextualise the 
responses given, is:   
 
Research question 1:To what extent do CFOs, ACCs and APs of UK listed companies 
companies believe the audit service is valuable to their 
company / client?  
 
Research question 2: To what extent do CFOs, ACCs and APs of UK listed 
companies believe key factors in the 2007 UK regulatory 




Within the results of the combined sample there may be some contrasting respondent 
perceptions.  Hence:  
Research question 3:  Do responses differ significantly by: 
a) respondent group; 
b) the extent to which respondents value audit? 
 
To obtain a fuller understanding of where the 2007 framework might be considered 
deficient, we seek the views of respondents regarding possible improvements.  Hence: 
 
Research question 4: What changes to the regulatory framework, or to the behaviour 
of auditors, do respondents believe would most improve audit 
quality? 
 
In 2009, the UK Treasury Committee, in its Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, 
questioned the usefulness of audit and suggested that the ‘big picture was lost in a sea 
of detail and regulatory disclosures’ (Treasury Committee, 2009, paragraph 221). 
Hence: 
 
Research question 5: To what extent do the findings of this study support the views of                 
the Treasury Committee about audit being ‘lost in a sea of 
detail and regulatory disclosures’ and indicate a possible 
unintended consequence of the changed regulatory regime?  
 
Methods 
The sample was taken from officially listed UK domestic companies, excluding AIM 
companies and investment trusts.6  A target sample size of 500 for each group was 
initially set, including the top 250 qualifying companies by market capitalisation (as at 
5th February 2007) and a systematic sample (every nth company ranked by market 
capitalisation) of 250 from the remaining qualifying companies.7  To eliminate multiple 
selections of audit committee chairs, the final sample of ACCs was reduced to 446.8   
 
AP respondents (i.e. those acting as engagement partner for qualifying companies) were 
identified by the 11 largest UK firms.  This information was not publicly available.  439 
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audit partners were identified for survey, which is close to the UK population of listed 
company audit partners.  For company specific questions audit partners were asked to 
respond in respect of their largest listed company client, referred to as ‘Client X.’.  
 
The research instrument used a combination of closed-form and open questions.  CFOs 
and ACCs were asked to value audit on a five point scale (from not at all to very 
valuable); APs were asked how their client valued audit.  This data is used as a basis 
for further analysis. 
 
The main part of the survey sought respondents’ views on factors affecting audit quality.  
The definition of audit quality in the survey instrument was taken from the UK Financial 
Reporting Council’s definition in their 2006 consultation: 
‘Obtaining sufficient and appropriate audit evidence to support the conclusions 
on which the audit report is based and making objective and appropriate audit 
judgements.  It involves appropriate and complete reporting by the auditors 
which enables the Audit Committee and the Board properly to discharge its 
responsibilities.’ (FRC, 2006b: 19) 
 
A total of 36 factors were listed, grouped into: 
a. Economic and general regulatory factors; 
b. Standards set by the Auditing Practices Board; 
c. Activities of the audit committee. 
The factors are listed in Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the impact of each factor on audit quality on a scale 
of 1 to 7, where 1 = serious undermines; 2 = moderately undermines; 3 = slightly 
undermines; 4 = no effect; 5 = slightly enhances; 6 = moderately enhances; 7 = 
greatly enhances.  Finally, an open question invited respondents to give their opinion 
on the changes to the regulatory framework, or to the behaviour of auditors which 
would most improve audit quality. 
 
A draft questionnaire was pretested with several finance directors, audit committee 
chairs and audit partners involved with listed companies.  Questionnaires to CFOs and 
ACCs were sent direct by the researchers in June 2007.  The AP surveys were distributed 
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at the same time by the firms.  All responses were returned direct to the researchers.  
Two reminder letters were sent and the audit firms followed up at the same time.  
 
Response rates and tests for bias 
For the CFO sample of 500, 149 usable responses were received, representing a response 
rate of 30%; for the ACC sample of 446, 130 usable responses were received, 
representing a response rate of 29%; and for the AP sample of 439, 219 usable responses 
were received, representing a response rate of 50%.  These rates compare very 
favourably with the rates typically obtained in recent years from senior executives (for 
example, Daugherty and Tervo (2008) obtain a response rate of 5.5% from a survey of 
CFOs, ACCs and CEOs of the S&P 500). 
 
To test for response bias, responders and non-responders in the CFO and ACC groups 
were compared on the basis of several background characteristics.  Table 2 provides an 
analysis of the respondents by Stock Exchange group, US listing, audit firm type and 
broad industry sector.  It is apparent that the characteristics of the respondent groups are 
broadly comparable.  There is no significant difference in the proportion of US listings 
across the 3 groups (χ2 = 2.800; p = 0.247), or the proportion of non-Big 4 affiliated 
respondents (χ2 = 2.157; p = 0.340), or the proportion of respondents affiliated to 
financial sector companies versus non-financial sector companies (χ2 = 3.830; p = 
0.147)9.  There are, however, differences in the distribution across Stock Exchange 
groups (χ2 = 16.823; p = 0.010).  In particular, there are a higher proportion of Fledgling 
respondents among the CFO sample, and more FTSE 250 respondents among the ACC 
sample.   
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
The validity of questionnaires can also be affected by the suitability of individual 
respondents, who should be both knowledgeable and involved in the relevant practices, 
usually at a senior level.  CFO respondents, based on job title, were CFO/Group CFO 
(74%), financial controller (9%), (group) chief accountant (3%), deputy CFO (1%) and 
other/non stated (13%).10  We therefore conclude that the risk of uninformed respondent 




Research question 1: Value placed on audit by respondents or their clients 
Table 3 shows the results of the question asking respondents to indicate how valuable 
audit is to them or, in the case of APs to their client X.  The combined sample results 
show that 65.3% in total consider audit to be valuable or very valuable.  CFOs are the 
most sceptical group with 15.9% classifying it as of little value or lower and only 11.7% 
rating it as very valuable.  The most surprising finding is that ACCs are actually more 
positive about audit value than APs believe their clients to be; 63.6% of ACCs chose the 
top two categories compared with 57.3% of APs and 45.5% of CFOs.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Research question 2: Perceptions of the impact of factors affecting audit quality- 
combined groups 
Table 4 shows the rank (out of 36), mean, median and standard deviation for each factor 
listed on the research instrument for the combined sample of CFOs, ACCs and APs.  To 
facilitate interpretation, the factors are classified as pre-existing (relative to SOX) 
regulatory factors (RP), new regulatory factors (RN) or ongoing economic factors (E).  
Based on the median response, the majority of factors are rated as having either no effect 
on (10 factors) or slightly enhancing (22 factors) audit quality, with only four scores 
outside 4 and 5 (three moderately enhancing and one slightly undermining).  It is 
interesting to note that three of the top five issues considered to most enhance audit 
quality are about aspects of audit committee activity.  This appears to be a strong 
affirmation for the changes in corporate governance codes (FRC, 2005) which have 
given audit committees a central role in managing the relationship between the company 
and the auditor. It also confirms the US evidence of the influence of audit committees 
(Center for Audit Quality, 2008; Cohen et al., 2009).   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The two other factors included in the top five are those in a position to influence the 
outcome of an audit not to have direct or indirect financial interest in the client or 
business relationships with the client (mean 5.50) and big four audit firm (mean 5.48).  
The former finding supports Dart (2009) regarding the threat of auditor lack of 
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independence.  The latter finding may have been affected by the high proportion big four 
APs and clients of big four firms included in the sample and responding to the 
questionnaire (see Table 2, panel (c)). Similarly not big four audit firm as an 
undermining factor may have been subject to the same influence.  However these 
findings do support the empirical evidence that a large firm auditor is a quality signal 
(Francis, 2004). 
 
Mandatory audit partner rotation (factors ranked 29 and 34) are perceived to have no 
significant impact on audit quality, consistent with Dutch evidence (Watrin et al., 2009) 
and counter to Fargher et al.’s (2008) Australian results.  Clearly the audit inspection 
regime and ISAs (factors ranked 23 and 30) are viewed as being minimally effective, 
consistent with recent evidence from other jurisdictions (Lennox and Pittman, 2010; 
Hecimovic et al., 2009).   
 
Only three factors have a mean evaluation score below 4 (i.e. issues which respondents 
believe undermine audit quality), with a further factor where the mean score is not 
significantly different from 4.  Two of these, management time and costs incurred in 
changing auditors and budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff (for which there 
was a high level of consensus) are economic factors which have not been fundamentally 
affected by the regulatory developments of the last 10 years.   
 
To test whether these factors are correlated and to reveal the key underlying dimensions, 
an exploratory factor analysis was undertaken in STATA using the principal factors 
method with varimax rotation (STATA, 2007).  Based on the eigenvalue ≥ 1 criterion 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978: 49), seven dimensions were extracted; however, a distinct 
‘elbow’ existed at nine dimensions, hence nine were retained.  Table 5 sets out these nine 
dimensions, in order of extraction, together with a subjective label based on each 
dimension’s main constituent factors.  The constituent factors with loadings of more than 
|0.50| are also shown along with the loadings.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Of these nine dimensions, the first three (economic risk; audit committee activities; and 
risk of regulatory action) explain a large proportion of the observed variation in 
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responses.  Economic risk and regulatory risk emerge as distinct dimensions.  Also, in 
relation to the audit committee, the second most enhancing factor (recent and relevant 
financial experience) is a unique dimension in its own right, uncorrelated with the other 
audit committee factors, indicating that the unobservable latent audit committee 
variables are two-dimensional.  Dimension 3, risk of regulatory action, covers three (out 
of four) recent changes which have increased the risk of regulatory action, two relating 
to the FRRP, and one to the AADB.  These issues were identified by (Beattie et al., 
1998, 1999). 
 
Research question 3: Perceptions of the impact of factors affecting audit quality - 
between group comparison 
Table 6 addresses research question 3(a) by summarising the 20 out of 36 factors where 
a significant difference in response existed between the groups (using the ANOVA test 
of difference at the 5% level).  It is evident that APs are more likely to give a different 
response from the both other two groups; CFOs and ACCs are more likely to have a 
shared perspective.  
 
[Tables 6 about here] 
 
For 11 of the issues, APs have a significantly higher score than at least one of the other 
groups (compared with 6 issues for CFOs and 8 for ACCs) indicating a higher level of 
optimism regarding the number of factors promoting audit quality.  The majority of 
issues that APs rank higher are economic issues included in the research instrument, e.g. 
risk of damage to audit partner’s reputation.  The results of big four audit firm show that 
APs are significantly more likely than their clients to rate this as an enhancing issue. 
 
The four items rated significantly lower by APs than both the other two groups are all 
issues which are the subject of ethical standards.  One of the issues that produced a large 
divergence of views between respondent groups was audit engagement partner or 
independent review partner not to act for more than five continuous years.  
Unsurprisingly, APs scored this lower and, with a mean of 3.65, actually believed that it 
undermined audit quality, while the other two groups evaluated it as a slight to moderate 
enhancement.  Other issues which imply some measure of constraint or control over the 
activities of auditors were significantly less highly rated by APs.  For example, AC has 
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procedures to ensure auditors’ independence and objectivity and their compliance with 
Auditing Practices Board ethical standards had a mean score of 5.13 by ACCs versus 
4.73 by APs. 
 
The ACCs predictably tended to give higher scores to the factors describing various 
aspects of the audit committee’s influence on audit quality, with four of the seven issues 
included in the research instrument producing scores significantly higher than both or 
one other respondent group. 
 
Factor analysis was undertaken for each individual respondent group.  Inspection of the 
detailed results reveals several interesting points of difference (due to space constraints, 
only a summary is presented in Table 7).  The APs appear to have a simpler factor 
structure compared to the ACCs and CFOs – for APs, fewer dimensions explain an 
equivalent amount of variation in the data.  For the APs, economic risk and risk of 
regulatory action combine to form a single top dimension.  For this group only, risk of 
investigation by the FRRP for the company emerges as a separate dimension.  The 
CFOs split audit committee factors into two separate dimensions; one concerning 
approvals and recommendations in relation to the auditor (dimension 3) and the other 
concerning audit quality more directly (dimension 9).  In contrast to the other groups, 
they include the audit inspection factor in with the audit firm ethics dimension.  For 
ACCs the factor ‘risk of damage to audit committee members’ personal reputation’ is 
grouped in with the risk of regulatory action dimension.   
 
[Table 7 about here]  
 
Significant differences in the perceptions of respondents who regard audit as more 
valuable compared with those who regard audit as less valuable (see Table 3 – 
addressing research question 3(b)) exist for twenty-three audit quality factors for the 
combined sample12.  Predictably, 22 of these factors are positive (i.e. those who value 
audit more highly tend to believe that more of the factors have a positive impact on audit 
quality).  The only issue rated more highly by those with a lower opinion of the value of 
audit was audit engagement partner or independent review partner not to act for more 
than five continuous years is (mean difference -0.29, not significant in any individual 
respondent group).  The CFOs’ evaluation of audit was most likely to impact on their 
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rating of individual factors affecting audit quality, since 15 significant differences were 
identified, all positive, compared with 12 for APs and just 5 for ACCs.   
 
Research question 4: Changes to the regulatory framework or to the behaviour of 
auditors which would most improve audit quality 
In an open question respondents were asked ‘In your opinion what changes to the 
regulatory framework, or to the behaviour of auditors, would most improve audit 
quality?’  A total of 158 comments were received from APs (72.1% of respondents who 
completed the section of the questionnaire), 78 from CFOs (52.3%) and 27 from ACCs 
(46.9%).  A thematic frequency analysis of the comments is shown in Table 8.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Perhaps predictably, only 2.7% of those who took the trouble to comment considered the 
current framework to be satisfactory.  Another group, who may have had misgivings 
about the existing framework, believed that a period of stability was desirable: 
‘The best change would be for the regulatory framework to stand still for a 
period of time to allow companies to catch up!’ (CFO 177) 
 
The most popular form of improvement across all three respondent groups was that 
prescriptive regulation was excessive and that judgement should again have a central 
role in the regulatory framework: 
‘The regulatory framework, whilst needing to be robust, must not stifle the 
ability of auditors to exercise individual judgment to ensure sensible outcomes 
to audit issues. The fear is that the framework is becoming too rules based to 
do this.’ (CFO 389) 
 
‘No more international box ticking.’ (ACC 99) 
 
‘Greater freedom to exercise professional judgment - provided of course that 
it is fully documented.  We need to move further away from prescriptive 
checklists which actually impair quality as they discourage intellectual 
challenge.  The UK environment is far better than US in this respect.’ (AP 88) 
 
 
The approach of the AIU, in particular, was questioned by APs: 
 
‘Changing the focus of the AIU from compliance with detail of auditing 
standards to matters of audit judgment – its effect is defensive auditing rather 
than enhanced audit quality.’ (AP 372) 
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The next most significant issue overall and among APs and CFOs was auditor rotation.  
The APs were very focused on the impact of the rules on engagement partners: 
‘5 yr partner rotation is too short and increases risk of audit failure. This is 
because too high a proportion of tenure is during ‘learning’ phase.  7 years 
was an appropriate balance.’ (AP299) 
 
While CFOs also picked up on this point, they were often concerned with broader 
continuity: 
 ‘Continuity of audit staff at management levels.’ (CFO 396) 
‘Enforced rotation of Engagement Partner after 5 years detracts from quality.’ 
(CFO 250) 
 
Possible improvements in the way that audit committees function, particularly their role 
with respect to setting audit fees, was a point raised by a substantial number of APs, but 
no other respondents.  There was some variability in the precise points raised but the 
following are representative and suggest that not all audit committees are competent or 
supportive of the audit process: this has been brought out by in the US by Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005).  
‘Further focus on the quality and independence of the audit committee – 
personal experience possibly biases view but have found myself fighting the 
board and audit committee chair on some key issues of principle.  A 
supportive chair would have made the experience far less stressful.’ (AP 504) 
  
‘Audit committees being fully prepared to pay the appropriate rate for a 
thorough audit.’ (AP 474) 
 
‘Role of non-execs is key.  AC chair needs to have real relevant experience say 
as audit partner of another firm.’ (AP 523).  
 
 
Comments about auditor behaviour were most common from ACCs and tended to 
suggest that excessive regulation would not improve standards of behaviour:  
‘Quality is achieved by having people of integrity in the company and in the 
audit team.’ (ACC 382) 
 
The issue of competition and choice among audit firms was picked up by a few 
respondents, especially CFOs: 
‘A means of injecting real competitive tension to the process. Even if I wanted 




Other issues raised included limitation of liability, the need to simplify auditing and 
accounting standards, strengthening peer review of audit working papers, transparency 
within audit firms and loosening regulation on non-audit services.  
 
Research Question 5: The extent to which the findings of this study support the views of 
the Treasury Committee about audit being ‘lost in a sea of detail and regulatory 
disclosures’ and indicate a possible unintended consequence of the changed regulatory 
regime 
 
The most frequently suggested change appearing in Table 8 (117 in total) was a move 
away from rules and box-ticking.  This provides some evidence that audit (and 
accounting) have moved more towards a complex process-driven activity and away from 
reliance on the judgement and integrity of the individual auditors.  The low impact 
attributed to the activities of the AIU also reflects a lack of support for the auditing 
standards and the inspection regime which may also be driving audit down a stricter 
compliance route.  Thus, both the quantitative and the qualitative evidence from the 
present study supports the analysis of Humphrey et al. (2009) regarding the 
transparency-based standards-surveillance-compliance regime, which would inevitably 
add to complexity. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has investigated the perceptions of 36 economic and regulatory audit quality 
factors held by 149 CFOs and 130 ACCs from UK listed companies and from 219 APs 
responsible for the audit of at least one UK listed company.  The results indicate that 
most factors are perceived, on average, to have moderately or slightly enhanced audit 
quality.  The recent regulatory changes which have given audit committees a more 
central role in the audit process are among the most highly rated factors, consistent with 
recent US findings (Center for Audit Quality, 2008; Cohen et al., 2009), although it 
should be noted that audit committees were regarded as very important in the Beattie et 
al. (1998) UK study.  None of the three issues considered to undermine audit quality is 
directly linked to the regulatory reforms.  However the Big Four / non-Big Four factor 
may have been influenced by the high proportion of Big Four APs and clients in the 
survey.   
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Exploratory factor analysis reduced the original set of 36 factors to nine uncorrelated 
dimensions: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit 
firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; 
audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit 
inspection.    Of these nine dimensions, the first three (economic risk; audit committee 
activities; and risk of regulatory action) explain a large proportion of the observed 
variation in responses. Interestingly, economic risk and regulatory risk are distinct 
dimensions.  Also, in relation to the audit committee, the second most enhancing factor 
(recent and relevant financial experience) is a unique dimension, uncorrelated with the 
other audit committee factors, indicating that the unobservable latent audit committee 
variables are two-dimensional.    
 
The declared attitudes and beliefs of different respondent groups were compared, 
revealing different perspectives.  APs were more likely to have a different and generally 
more positive perspective than the other respondent groups and they ranked a number of 
the economic factors as significantly more enhancing than the other groups.  Conversely, 
some ethical standards (obviously a constraint on their activities) were ranked by APs as 
undermining audit quality.  Unsurprisingly, ACCs were particularly enthusiastic about 
the regulatory reforms involving the audit committee.  Comparison of the factor structure 
of the three groups revealed further significant points of difference.  For the APs, 
economic risk and risk to auditors of regulatory action combined to form a single 
dimension, with the risk of investigation by the FRRP for the company being a separate 
dimension.  The CFOs split audit committee activities into two distinct dimensions; one 
concerning approvals and recommendations in relation to the auditor and the other 
concerning audit quality monitoring more directly.   
 
The majority of respondents believe audit to be either valuable or very valuable.  It is 
surprising that APs feel that their own service is not always highly valued by their clients 
and ACCs think more of audit than APs believe their clients do.  This result suggests that 
audit may still be viewed as a commodity or may, as the Treasury Committee suggests, 
be ‘lost in a sea of detail and regulatory disclosures’.  CFOs were the most sceptical 
group about the value of audit but only a small minority rated audit as of little value or 
worse.  As might be expected, respondents who value audit have a more positive view 
on impact of individual factors on audit quality. 
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The nature of recent regulation was heavily criticised in comments about possible 
future changes to the regulatory framework and auditor behaviour.  As not all 
respondents made comments, the set of comments may not be representative of the 
whole group, however, some important themes emerged.  Recent regulatory change 
was considered to be rife with rules and box ticking.  The five year mandatory 
requirement for audit partner rotation was heavily criticised by many as being too 
short, especially by APs; and the AIU was criticised for its process / documentation 
focus.  Respondents’ widespread concern that these aspects of the changed regime are 
largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, indicates 
there may be overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists, supporting 
Hirchleifer’s (2008) psychological bias theory of regulation. This evidence also 
supports the concerns of the Treasury Committee (2009).  
 
The results should be of direct interest to policy makers in assessing the impact of the 
range of recent changes that have been introduced into the UK auditing framework 
and in considering possible future developments, thus supporting evidence-based 
policy-making.  The enhanced role of audit committees especially seems to be 
welcomed, particularly where best practice is followed and the extension of the period 
of audit partner rotation from five to seven years (APB, 2009b) is supported.  The 
trend of recent regulation away from an emphasis on professional judgment and 
further towards Wade’s (2007) ‘standards-surveillance-compliance’ regulatory system 
is questioned by some respondents.  Findings suggest that, from an effectiveness 
perspective, the changes to the corporate governance and FRRP regimes have been 
more effective than the audit inspection regime.  However it must be borne in mind 
that it is mainly the auditors who are affected by the AIU, whereas the governance 
and FRRP regimes affect finance directors, audit committees and auditors.  
 
The emerging evidence of an unintended consequence of the changed regime causing 
audit to become overly process driven is of considerable concern.  There is some 
evidence that the pursuit of a higher level of compliance in audit performance, which 
is a good thing, has also resulted in a devaluation of what is a vital contribution to the 
integrity of financial reporting.  
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The present study has a number of the limitations normally associated with a 
questionnaire approach, notably noise and potential response bias.  However these 
risks are mitigated by the seniority of the respondents (minimising the risk of 
uninformed respondent bias) and the relatively high response rate obtained.  While the 
present study focuses on the views of three preparer groups, future research could 
usefully investigate the views of user groups particularly in relation to the audit 





                                                 
1
 The AADB was previously called the Accounting Investigation and Discipline Board; the POB was 
previously called the Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy. 
2
 The IAASB is the international auditing standard-setting board.  It is an independent board of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the global organisation for the accountancy 
profession. 
3
 The Code is subject to regular review, and an updated version was issued in June 2008. 
4
 Government regulation may be direct or may be delegated to a government agency. 
5
 Review results took the form of a clean report (no significant internal control weaknesses), modified 
report (significant but not serious internal control weaknesses) or adverse report (serious or very serious 
weaknesses). 
6
 AIM companies are excluded because they are not yet required to adopt IFRS; investment trusts are 
excluded because, as they do not trade, their accounting, auditing and governance is very different.  
7
 For a variety of reasons, several companies in the initial sample were reselected (e.g. company had 
delisted, merged or demerged, or moved domicile since their last annual report; company reported 
under US GAAP).  A replacement was sought from the same industry group and with the closest 
market capitalisation). 
8
 The initial company sample resulted in 58 companies (33 involving the top 250) where the audit 
committee chair had been selected more than once (in three cases, four times).  The 27 cases involving non-
top 250 companies were reselected, but this often produced new duplications.  
9
 A χ2 test of association between respondent group and the six broad industry sectors was, however, 
significant (χ2 = 26.795; p = 0.003).  Comparison of the expected frequencies with the actual 
frequencies revealed that the AP group contained markedly more respondents affiliated to industrial 
companies and markedly less affiliated to consumer companies than the other two groups. 
10
 ACC respondents were all audit committee chairs, with the exception of two who were Deputy 
Chairs; included AP respondents were all listed company audit engagement partners (4 responses were 
eliminated as they did not fall within the criteria set for the following reasons: client reported under US 
GAAP only, client not yet on IFRS (AIM company), AP audited investment trusts only; and client was 
a public sector organisation). 
11 Seven factors from Table 4 do not feature in Table 5, due to their ‘uniqueness’.  These factors are: 
management time and costs incurred in changing auditors; budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff; 
competition among audit firms; disclosure of non-audit fees paid to auditor with detailed breakdown; audit 
firm to establish policies and procedures to ensure that partner and staff are not rewarded/promoted  for 
selling non-audit services to their audit clients; audit firm to establish monitoring procedures to ensure 
compliance with its policies; and one audit  committee member has ‘recent and relevant financial 
experience’.  STATA reports each variable’s ‘uniqueness’, with values greater than 0.6 indicating that the 
variable is not well-explained by the extracted factor (STATA, 2007: 290).  The first four factors just listed 
meet this cut-off, while the remaining three are close to it.  The first four of these factors emerge as lesser 
dimensions (dimensions 12, 13, 15 and 10, respectively) in their own right.  Audit firm non-audit 
services policies seems to be two-dimensional, loading moderately highly on dimension 4 (audit firm 
ethics) and dimension 10 (non-audit service fee disclosure).  Audit firm policy compliance procedures 
loads moderately on three dimensions (audit firm ethics; economic independence of audit firm; and 
economic risk).  Finally, ‘recent and relevant financial experience’ of one audit committee member 
loads moderately on dimension 2 (audit committee activities) but also on a lesser and unique dimension 
11. 
12
 For this analysis, a dichotomous variable was created based on the responses in Table 3 - respondents 
who considered audit to be of no, little or moderate values were combined into one group, while those who 
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Economic and general regulatory factors 
affecting audit quality 
(a) Management time and costs incurred in changing 
auditors 
(b) Big four audit firm 
(c) Not Big four audit firm 
(d) Competition among audit firms  
(e) Partners’ desire not to lose status by losing key 
client  
(f) Client important to firm’s overall portfolio  
(g) Budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff  
(h) Client assessed as high audit risk  
(i) Risk of litigation against audit firm  
(j) Risk of damage to auditors firm’s reputation from 
public scandals  
(k) Risk of damage to audit partner’s personal 
reputation 
(l) Risk of damage to audit committee members’ 
personal reputation 
(m) Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel: 
i. for company 
ii. for auditor 
(n) 
 
Risk to audit firm of disciplinary action by  FRC 
Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board 
(AADB) 
(o) Risk to audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor 
status 
(p) Disclosure of non-audit fees paid to auditor with 
detailed breakdown 
(q) Introduction of  International Standards of 
Auditing (ISAs) for December 2005 year ends 
(r) Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) carrying out 
independent inspections of public interest audits 


























Influence on audit quality of standards set 
by the Auditing Practices Board  
(a) Partner independent of the audit to review all 
aspects of the audit engagement  
(b) Audit firm to take responsibility for a control 
environment that places compliance with ethical 
standards above commercial considerations 
(c) Audit firm to designate ethics partner to ensure 
compliance with ethical standards 
(d) Audit firm to establish policies and procedures to 
ensure that partner and staff are not 
rewarded/promoted  for selling non-audit services to 
their audit clients 
(e) Audit engagement partner or independent review 
partner not to act for more than five continuous 
years  
(f) Other audit partners or other staff in senior positions 
not to act for more than seven years 
(g) Those in a position to influence the outcome of an 
audit not to have direct or indirect financial interest 
in the  client or business relationships with the client 
(h) Total fees from listed client not normally to exceed 
10% annual fee income of firm 
(i) Total fees from listed client not to exceed 10% of 
the base on which the client’s engagement partner’s 
profit share is calculated 
(j) Audit firm to establish monitoring procedures to 
ensure compliance with its policies  
 
Influence of activities of the audit committee 
on audit quality 
 (a) Audit committee: 
i. is composed of independent non-executive 
directors 
ii. is primarily responsible for recommending the 
appointment, re-appointment and removal of 
auditors to the board 
iii. approves the terms of engagement and the 
remuneration of the external auditor  
iv. ensures an adequate audit can be carried out for 
the fee 
v. has procedures to ensure auditors’ independence 
and objectivity and their compliance with 
Auditing Practices Board ethical standards  
(b) One audit  committee member has ‘recent and 
relevant financial experience’  
(c) Auditor required to communicate with the audit 
committee on all key issues associated with the 




Table 2:  Analysis of Respondent Groups by Stock Exchange Group, US Listing, 
Audit Firm Type and Industry Sector 
 
Panel (a): Stock Exchange Group 
Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 





Group No. % No. % No. % 
FTSE 100 44 29.7 31 24.2 52 24.1 
FTSE 250 48 32.4 57 44.5 85 39.3 
FTSE Small-Cap 43 29.1 37 28.9 75 34.7 
Fledgling 13 8.8 3 2.3 4 1.9 
Missing 1 - 2 - 3 - 
Total 149 100.0 130 100.0 219 100.0 
 
Panel (b): US Listing 
 Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 
Chair (ACC) sample 
Audit Partner 
(AP) sample 
 No. % No. % No. % 
US listing 18 12.1 8 6.2 23 10.5 
 
Panel (c): Audit Firm Type 
Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 





Audit firm type No. % No. % No. % 
Big four 131 88.5 118 91.5 188 86.2 
Non-big four 17 11.5 11 8.5 30 13.8 
Missing 1 - 1 - 1 - 
Total 149 100.0 130 100.0 219 100.0 
 
Panel (d): Industry Sector 
Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 




No. % No. % No. % 
Financials 30 20.3 28 21.7 31 14.2 
Consumer goods 25 16.9 21 16.3 18 8.3 
Services 56 37.8 40 31.0 66 30.3 
Industrials 23 15.5 27 20.9 52 23.9 
Resources 9 6.1 10 7.8 40 18.3 
Utilities 5 3.4 3 2.3 11 5.0 
Missing 1 - 1 - 1 - 
Total 149 100.0 130 100.0 219 100.0 
 
Notes to table: 
a) Percentages are based on non-missing values. 
b) The 10 Level 3 Datastream economic groups were combined to form 6 groups as follows: 
cyclical and non-cyclical consumer goods are combined; cyclical and non-cyclical services are 




Table 3: How Valuable is Audit to your Company/Client X? 
 
Response CFO ACC AP Combined 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Not at all 2 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.4 
Of little value 21 14.5 9 7.6 6 2.8 36 7.5 
Moderately valuable 56 38.6 34 28.8 87 39.9 177 36.8 
Valuable 49 33.8 48 40.7 97 44.5 194 40.3 
Very valuable 17 11.7 27 22.9 28 12.8 72 15.0 
Sub-total 145 100.0 118 100.0 218 100.0 481 100.0 
Missing 4  12  1    
Total 149  130  219  498  
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Table 4:  Perceptions of the Impact of Factors Affecting Audit Quality – 
Combined Sample 
 
Id Category Factora Rank Meanb,c Median Std 
devd 
1 RN Auditor required to communicate with the audit 
committee on all key issues associated with the 
audit, and with ethical standards  
1 5.63 6 0.89 
2 RN One audit  committee member has ‘recent and 
relevant financial experience’  




Those in a position to influence the outcome of 
an audit not to have direct or indirect financial 
interest in the  client or business relationships 
with the client  
3 5.50 5 1.16 
4 E Big four audit firm 4 5.48 6 1.18 
5 RP AC is composed of independent non-executive 
directors 
5 5.41 5 0.88 
6 RN Audit firm to establish monitoring procedures to 
ensure compliance with its policies  
6 5.32 5 0.91 
7 RN Partner independent of the audit to review all 
aspects of the audit engagement  
7 5.26 5 0.84 
8 E Client assessed as high audit risk  8 5.18 5 1.06 
9 E Risk of damage to audit partner’s personal 
reputation 
9= 5.15 5 1.23 
10 RP Risk to audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor 
status 
9= 5.15 5 1.37 
11 RN 
(proactive) 
Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel for auditor 
11 5.10 5 1.11 
12 RP Total fees from listed client not normally to 
exceed 10% annual fee income of firm 
12 5.07 5 1.13 
13 RN AC ensures an adequate audit can be carried out 
for the fee 
13 5.04 5 0.94 
14 E Risk of damage to audit firm’s reputation from 
public scandals  
14 5.02 5 1.31 
15 RN AC is primarily responsible for recommending 
the appointment, re-appointment and removal of 
auditors to the board 
15 5.01 5 0.93 
16 RN 
(new body) 
Risk to audit firm of disciplinary action by  FRC 
Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board 
(AADB) 
16 4.99 5 1.09 
17 RN Audit firm to take responsibility for a control 
environment that places compliance with ethical 
standards above commercial considerations 
17 4.90 5 1.01 
18 E Risk of damage to audit committee members’ 
personal reputation 
18 4.89 5 1.01 
19 RN AC has procedures to ensure auditors’ 
independence and objectivity and their 
compliance with Auditing Practices Board ethical 
standards  
19 4.88 5 0.83 
20 RN 
(proactive) 
Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel for company 
20 4.84 5 0.93 
21 RN Total fees from listed client not to exceed 10% of 
the base on which the client’s engagement 
partner’s profit share is calculated 
21 4.83 5 1.02 
22 RN AC approves the terms of engagement and the 
remuneration of the external auditor  
22 4.81 5 0.87 
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23 RN Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) carrying out 
independent inspections of public interest audits 
and publishing reports  
23 4.80 5 1.04 
24 E Risk of litigation against audit firm  24 4.76 5 1.29 
25 RN Audit firm to designate ethics partner to ensure 
compliance with ethical standards 
25 4.63 5 0.85 
26 RN Audit firm to establish policies and procedures to 
ensure that partner and staff are not 
rewarded/promoted  for selling non-audit services 
to their audit clients 
26 4.62 4 0.86 
27 E Competition among audit firms  27 4.54 4 1.19 
28 E Client important to firm’s overall portfolio  28 4.28 4 1.14 
29 RN Other audit partners or other staff in senior 
positions not to act for more than seven years 
29 4.26 4 1.18 
30 RN Introduction of  International Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs) for December 2005 year ends 
30 4.21 4 1.05 
31 E Partner’s desire not to lose status by losing key 
client  
31= 4.12 4 1.15 
32 RN 
(extended) 
Disclosure of non-audit fees paid to auditor with 
detailed breakdown 
31= 4.12 4 0.65 
33 RN Audit engagement partner or independent review 
partner not to act for more than five continuous 
years  
33 4.08 4 1.44 
34 E Management time and costs incurred in changing 
auditors 
34 3.68 4 0.96 
35 E Budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff  35 3.45 4 0.78 
36 E Not Big four audit firm 36 3.27 3 1.06 
    Notes to table: 
  a). Factors are shown in decreasing rank order. 
  b) Response scale is:  1. Seriously undermines,   2. Moderately undermines,   3. 
Slightly undermines,   4. No effect,   5. Slightly enhances,   6. Moderately enhances,   
7.  Greatly enhances. 
c). Factor group means which are NOT significantly different from 4 (no effect) at the 
5% level (two-tailed) are shown with a grey background to cell. 
  d). High consensus (std. dev. ≤ 0.85) shown in bold; low consensus (std. dev. ≥ 1.25) 
shown in italics. 
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1 Economic risk Risk of damage to audit firm’s reputation from public scandals 0.87 14 
  
Risk of damage to audit partner’s personal reputation 0.82 9= 
  
Risk of litigation against audit firm 0.78 24 
  
Client assessed as high audit risk 0.63 8 
  
Risk of damage to audit committee members’ personal 
reputation 
0.53 18 
2 Audit committee 
activities 
AC approves the terms of engagement and the remuneration of 
the external auditor 
0.81 22 
  
AC is primarily responsible for recommending the 




AC ensures an adequate audit can be carried out for the fee 0.69 13 
  
AC has procedures to ensure auditors’ independence and 




AC is composed of independent non-executive directors 0.60 5 
  
Auditor required to communicate with the audit committee on 
all key issues associated with the audit, and with ethical 
standards 
0.51 1 
3 Risk of regulatory 
action 




Risk to audit firm of disciplinary action by  FRC Accounting 
Investigation and Discipline Board (AADB) 
0.71 16 
  




Risk to audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor status 0.60 9= 
4 Audit firm ethics Audit firm to take responsibility for a control environment that 




Audit firm to designate ethics partner to ensure compliance 
with ethical standards 
0.72 25 
  






Total fees from listed client not normally to exceed 10% 
annual fee income of firm 
0.78 12 
  
Total fees from listed client not to exceed 10% of the base on 




Those in a position to influence the outcome of an audit not to 
have direct or indirect financial interest in the  client or 
business relationships with the client  
0.52 3 
6 Audit partner 
rotation 
Audit engagement partner or independent review partner not to 
act for more than five continuous years 
0.84 33 
  
Other audit partners or other staff in senior positions not to act 
for more than seven years 
0.84 29 
7 Risk of client loss Client important to firm’s overall portfolio 0.74 28 
  
Partner’s desire not to lose status by losing key client 0.73 31= 
8 Audit firm size Not Big four audit firm -0.65 36 
  
Big four audit firm 0.62 4 
9 Audit inspection 
and ISAs 
Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) carrying out independent 
inspections of public interest audits and publishing reports 
0.57 23 
  
Introduction of  International Standards of Auditing (ISAs) for 
December 2005 year ends 
0.53 30 
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 Table 6:  Summary of Specific Audit Quality Factors for which there are Significant 
Differences between Respondent Groups 
 
Id Factor 
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly more than either CFOs or ACCs 
8 Client assessed as high audit risk  
9 Risk of damage to audit partner’s personal reputation 
14 Risk of damage to audit firm’s reputation from public scandals  
24 Risk of litigation against audit firm  
28 Client important to firm’s overall portfolio  
4 Big four audit firm 
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly less than either CFOs or ACCs  
21 Total fees from listed client not to exceed 10% of the base on which the client’s engagement partner’s profit share is 
calculated 
26 Audit firm to establish policies and procedures to ensure that partner and staff are not rewarded/promoted  for selling 
non-audit services to their audit clients 
29 Other audit partners or other staff in senior positions not to act for more than seven years 
33 Audit engagement partner or independent review partner not to act for more than five continuous years  
 ACCs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly more than either CFOs or APs 
13 AC ensures an adequate audit can be carried out for the fee 
15 AC is primarily responsible for recommending the appointment, re-appointment and removal of auditors to the board 
22 AC approves the terms of engagement and the remuneration of the external auditor  
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly more than CFOs 
17 Audit firm to take responsibility for a control environment that places compliance with ethical standards above 
commercial considerations 
18 Risk of damage to audit committee members’ personal reputation 
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly more than ACCs 
3 Those in a position to influence the outcome of an audit not to have direct or indirect financial interest in the  client 
or business relationships with the client  
11 Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting Review Panel for auditor 
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly less than CFOs  
32 Disclosure of non-audit fees paid to auditor with detailed breakdown 
 APs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly less than ACCs 
19 AC has procedures to ensure auditors’ independence and objectivity and their compliance with Auditing Practices 
Board ethical standards  
 ACCs consider factor enhances audit quality significantly less than either CFOs or APs 
10 Risk to audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor status 
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Descriptive label Principal constituent audit quality factors for combined sample Dimension no. 
   CFO ACC AP 
1 Economic risk Risk of damage to audit firm’s reputation from public scandals 1 3 1 
  
Risk of damage to audit partner’s personal reputation 1 3 1 
  
Risk of litigation against audit firm 1 3 1 
  
Client assessed as high audit risk 
 3 1 
  
Risk of damage to audit committee members’ personal reputation 1 2 1 
2 Audit committee activities AC approves the terms of engagement and the remuneration of the external auditor 6 1 2 
  
AC is primarily responsible for recommending the appointment, re-appointment and removal of auditors to the 
board 
6 1 2 
  
AC ensures an adequate audit can be carried out for the fee [6&9] 1 2 
  
AC has procedures to ensure auditors’ independence and objectivity and their compliance with Auditing Practices 
Board ethical standards 
9 1 2 
  
AC is composed of independent non-executive directors [6] 1 2 
  
Auditor required to communicate with the audit committee on all key issues associated with the audit, and with 
ethical standards 
6 1 2 
3 Risk of regulatory action Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting Review Panel for auditor 2 2 1 
  
Risk to audit firm of disciplinary action by  FRC Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB) 2 2 1 
  
Risk of investigation by the Financial Reporting Review Panel for company 2 2 9 
  
Risk to audit firm of loss of Registered Auditor status 2 2 1 
4 Audit firm ethics Audit firm to take responsibility for a control environment that places compliance with ethical standards above 
commercial considerations 
3 4 3 
  
Audit firm to designate ethics partner to ensure compliance with ethical standards 3 4 3 
  
Partner independent of the audit to review all aspects of the audit engagement 3 [4&1] 3 
5 Economic independence of 
auditor 
Total fees from listed client not normally to exceed 10% annual fee income of firm 5 5 5 
  
Total fees from listed client not to exceed 10% of the base on which the client’s engagement partner’s profit share is 
calculated 
5 5 5 
  
Those in a position to influence the outcome of an audit not to have direct or indirect financial interest in the  client 
or business relationships with the client  
[5]&10 [5] [5] 
6 Audit partner rotation Audit engagement partner or independent review partner not to act for more than five continuous years 4 7 4 
  
Other audit partners or other staff in senior positions not to act for more than seven years 4 7 4 
7 Risk of client loss Client important to firm’s overall portfolio 7 9 6 
  
Partner’s desire not to lose status by losing key client 7 12 6 
8 Audit firm size Not Big four audit firm 8 6 8 
  
Big four audit firm 8 6 8 
9 Audit inspection and ISAs  Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) carrying out independent inspections of public interest audits and publishing reports 3 8 7 
  
Introduction of  International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) for December 2005 year ends [2] 8 7 
 





     
Table 8: Analysis of Comments in Response to ‘In your opinion what changes to 
the regulatory framework, or to the behaviour of auditors, would most improve 
audit quality?’ 
 
Response CFO ACC AP Combined 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Move away  from rules and box-ticking 36 46.1 21 34.4 60 38.0 117 39.3 
Ease 5 year rotation rule  15 19.2 6 9.8 41 25.9 62 20.9 
Competence of audit committees and fee 
pressure from the client   
0 0 0 0 29 18.4 29 9.8 
Integrity more important than regulation  5 6.4 10 16.4 9 5.7 24 8.1 
Other improvements to audit quality 10 12.8 8 13.1 4 2.5 22 7.4 
Period of stability in regulation needed  1 1.3 8 13.1 7      4.4 16 5.4 
Improve competition and choice  7 9.0 2 3.3 4 2.5 13 4.4 
Framework  satisfactory 2 2.6 4 6.6 2 1.3 8 2.7 
Ease complexity in accounting / auditing 2 2.6 2 3.3 2 1.3 6 2.0 
Sub-total 78 100.0 61 100.0 158 100.0 297 100.0 
Missing 71  69  61  201  
Total 149  130  219  498  
 
 
